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Abstract 
The evolution of the understanding of evidence-based proof and decision 
processes in the law, especially criminal law, and standards of proof in this area, 
has a long-standing and controversial history. Competing accounts cause the legal 
scholarship to engage in critical and thoughtful exchanges. Some of the divergent 
views reflect different methodological perspectives similarly recognized in other 
fields, such as applied psychology and economy, and the broader interdisciplinary 
research fields of judgment and decision-making, system analysis and decision 
science. One such methodological perspective asserts that accounts of juridical 
proof should provide a description and explanation of how the legal system 
actually works as a whole. Other – more mathematical and analytical accounts – 
concentrate on how, ideally, legal decision-making under uncertainty ought to be 
made in order be considered sensible. This paper focuses on the relative 
plausibility (RP) account advocated by Professors Allen and Pardo as an example 
of the former perspective. Its logical structure and argumentative implications are 
analysed using elements of decision theory, which is the prime representative of 
the latter, more mathematical approach to legal proof. Using formal diagrammatic 
schemes to depict the structural relationships between the core elements of the two 
accounts, it is demonstrated in what sense they can be considered logically related 
and congruent. The demonstration shows that the principal disagreements among 
the proponents of the two examined theories derive from differences in (i) the 
criteria used to judge the adequacy of competing accounts of legal decision-
making, and (ii) the level of formalization of the bases of decisions in each 
candidate account. This structural analysis supports the view that adherence to one 
or the other of the examined perspectives does not imply a contradiction, but 
reflects the coverage of different aspects of the same overall decision architecture. 
Using decision-theoretic notions, our analyses also provide a way to explain RP 
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decisions through an explicit criterion, thus providing a reply to the recurrent 





“Our approach does not eliminate the need for you to make judgments 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The relative plausibility account of the criminal standard of proof 
 
In a series of papers, Professors Ronald J. Allen and Michael Pardo have 
developed and defended an explanatory account of juridical proof based on the 
notion of ‘relative plausibility’, which we shall refer to as the theory of “RP” as a 
short-hand.2 Unlike probabilistic conceptualizations, their theory does not rely on 
any particular numerical threshold, such as the commonly featured 0.5 threshold 
for the typical civil case, or any other particular numerical value for more austere 
standards of proof. Instead, RP is essentially comparative in nature and 
concentrates on competing explanations advanced by parties. In this context, the 
notion of explanation is understood in at least two different dimensions. In one 
dimension, standards of decision for individual cases are conceptualized as 
inquiries into the extent to which a given party’s story can account for – or so to 
say ‘explain’ – the evidence in a case and the objects of the party in the litigation. 
In the second dimension, RP is considered explanatory – in a descriptive sense – 
for what actually happens at trial, that is how the law structures the legal process 
as whole3 and how litigants behave.4 
 
1 Irving H. LaValle, Fundamentals of Decision Analysis, 1978, at 13 (italics as in original). 
2 E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and its Critics, 23 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 5–59 (2018).  
3 Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Clarifying Relative Plausibility: A Rejoinder, 23 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 205–217 (2019), (“relative plausibility is not only 
about jury decision-making and the decision rules at trial. Its scope is much broader. It is about the 
entire process of proof” at 207), Allen & Pardo, supra note 2 (“What is being observed is the entire 
litigation process. (...) what is the best explanation of the data, where “the data” are observations 
of how the American legal system structures proof at trial” at 7). 
4 Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 Law and 
Philosophy 223–268 (2008) (“Understanding the standards in terms of competing explanations 
more accurately describes what occurs at trial, [and] is consistent with the [sic] our best 
understanding of the reasoning processes of jurors” at 261), Allen & Pardo, supra note 3 (“The 
primary message of relative plausibility is that from the beginning to end the legal system pushes 
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These two dimensions of explanation in the RP account are apt to the civil 
contest. In civil disputes, contesting parties each seek to explain the evidence 
according to their objects. The legal paradigm for resolution of this contest places 
the explanations of each party in relative comparison apropos which is (more) 
plausible: this is the product of the preponderance standard. Suppose a standard 
civil claim. A lends B 500 USD, but later claims that B has defaulted on the loan 
and sues for repayment. B denies this allegation and argues that he never actually 
received the money from A. For such a case the RP account amounts to, in 
essence, the fact-finder assessing whether the plaintiff or the defendant produces 
a better5 account, given all the evidence presented.  
The criminal case involves somewhat wider considerations. Allen and Pardo 
describe them as follows: 
“In criminal cases, under the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard, the 
prosecution must do more than present a better explanation than the 
defense (or the best available explanation): fact-finders convict only 
when the prosecution’s explanation (which includes all of the legal 
elements) is plausible, given the evidence, and there is no plausible 
defense explanation.”6  
The RP account thus focuses on examining whether explanatory thresholds 
are met. This involves a staged scheme of plausibility assessment, followed by 
particular legal conclusions of conviction or acquittal. According to this scheme, 
the first issue is whether the prosecution has a plausible story, capable to warrant 
a guilty verdict for if there is no such account, the defendant is to be acquitted. If 
such a plausible account is provided by the prosecution, then, second, the fact-
finder has to assess whether the defense offers a plausible story. If a plausible 
defense account is provided, then the defendant merits an acquittal,7 even if the 
defense account is considered less plausible than the one offered by the 
prosecution. 
Allen and Pardo describe the criminal case in a manner that places the 
prosecution and defence in positions relative to each other. To be clear, central to 
their view is that there is no external measure against which each side is assessed. 
This is in contrast to the more conventional understanding that regards the legal 
requirement of beyond reasonable doubt for criminal litigation, unlike that in civil, 
to change the respective positions of the parties, not as relative to each other, but 
 
the parties to provide competing explanations, and these explanations structure the decision that is 
subsequently made (even if the decision is based on an explanation not advanced by the parties).” 
at 208). 
5 The critical reader might immediately invoke the question of how one is to understand 
‘better’. This question will be discussed later in § III.1. 
6 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 16. 
7 Id. (“any plausible explanation consistent with innocence (one that has not been disproven 
or eliminated) is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt” at 27). 
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as relative to a legal standard. That is, the prosecution’s account is assessed 
relative to what is embodied in the notion of beyond reasonable doubt; the account 
of the defence (whether through adducing evidence or challenging the 
prosecution) is relative to what is encompassed within the notion of a reasonable 
doubt. While the concept of RP is completely different from this conventional 
explanation of criminal litigation, RP as a model is attractive to explain empirical 
aspects of civil disputes because it can relate the accounts of the parties to each 
other as a result of the civil standard requiring nothing more than an adjudgment 
of the relative merits of the competing accounts. It is, of course, reasonable to 
consider that courts in criminal cases may relate the accounts of prosecution and 
defence to each other. That is, if the prosecution presents a plausible account 
which is not plausibly infringed by the defence, the fact finder will convict. In this 
sense, RP offers a model to explain the objects of litigants (the first dimension) 
and the objects of trial (the second dimension).  
The application of the model to the criminal trial may be difficult, however, 
for mindsets strictly adhering to the view that the plausibility of the account 
proffered (by prosecution or defence) is relative to the standard of proof required. 
The result is a dearth of revelation regarding how decision makers resolve criminal 
disputes because the content and concept of reasonable doubt, and what takes us 
beyond that (for conviction), remains opaque. But, Allen and Pardo do not purport 
to resolve such matters through their model. Their point is to emphasize that the 
explicitly non-numerical nature of their account is an advantage over the 
probabilistic account. They argue that controversies over how to exactly define 
particular standards of proof (i.e., numerically and in terms of fixed ‘probability 
points’), such as the beyond a reasonable doubt or the “notoriously obscure clear-
and-convincing-evidence-standard”,8 are naturally and effectively avoided. 
Clearly, by focusing the attention on what practitioners can and are said to already 
do, i.e. operating in qualitative and comparative ways, the RP account should gain 
attractiveness. But critical commentators regard this feature as a weakness. 
Professor Nance, for example, questions “whether this [=plausibility] advances 
our understanding discernibly”.9 He notes that the RP account offers no clear 
answer to the issue of “how strong must one’s doubt be before it becomes a 
reasonable one”,10 and that “[t]his question is not illuminated by being told a 
doubt is strong enough to be reasonable when the pro-defense explanation is 
‘plausible’.”11 To some extent, it thus seems as though we face a paradoxical 
impasse: a controversial aspect – the question of quantitative thresholds – that RP 
dissolves, is, in turn, invoked as a feature that it lacks. This impasse reveals an 
 
8 Id., at 29. 
9 Dale A. Nance, The Limitations of Relative Plausibility Theory, 23 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 154–160 (2019), at 157.  
10 Id., emphasis as in original. 
11 Id. 
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area for future research, especially regarding “possibilities for formalizing aspects 
of relative plausibility (...) [and] compatibilities between the explanatory and 
probabilistic perspectives”.12  
 
2. Contents and structure of this paper 
 
In this paper, we examine the RP concept using elements of decision theory. 
Our analysis will rely on the idea of interpreting plausibility assessments as 
decisions that are to be made in the light of uncertainty that inevitably attends all 
real-world proceedings. We believe that regarding RP assertions as decisions is 
descriptively valid and minimally constraining. As a methodological starting 
point, it also looks compatible with the way in which the developers of the RP 
theory describe their account:  
“The ‘relative plausibility’ theory explains the process as involving 
reasoning put to the effort of deciding the relative plausibility of the 
parties’ various explanations of the evidence and contested events”13 
[emphasis added] 
The choice of a decisional perspective as a starting point is intricate, however, 
because formal decision analyses are regarded critically in this context. For 
example, Allen & Pardo have noted: 
“(...) we doubt that there will be a well-organized science (or 
philosophical thought) of how people decide one explanation is better 
than another, even though that is precisely what people do in a virtually 
infinite number of ways.”14 [emphasis added] 
We thus seek to be clear about the sense in which we intend to pursue the 
analysis of RP from a decision-analytic perspective. Our analysis will not claim 
to provide a descriptive account of how people decide, or supposedly decide. 
Instead, we will seek to capture (i) the inevitable and fundamental structural 
elements of the ‘problem’ of deciding about RP as faced by anybody who intends 
to apply the plausibility scheme, and (ii) the logical relationships among the 
elements thus identified.  
Likewise, the decision-analytic account that we provide does not purport to 
prescribe how one ought to decide, neither in general nor in particular cases. 
Rather, our account aims to clarify what we shall call the anatomy of the decisional 
task. It seeks to help decision-makers conceptualize and structure their assessment 
 
12 Allen & Pardo, supra note 3, at 215. A number of evidence scholars have already questioned 
the intelligibility of an all-or-nothing choice between atomistic and holistic approaches. For more 
discussion see e.g. William Twining, Hot Air in the Redwoods, A Sequel to The Wind in the 
Willows, 86 Michigan Law Review 1523–1547 (1988), at 1543. 
13 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 6. Similarly, at 34, the same authors note that “the fact-
finder is essentially asked to decide which [source of causation] is more plausible”. 
14 Allen & Pardo, supra note 3, at 210. 
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task (of RP) in a transparent and logically defensible way. We anticipate that this 
analysis will show that there is a neat and non-conflictual relationship between RP 
decisions and the formal decision-theoretic account of legal decision-making as 
described in existing literature.15  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section II will introduce elements of classic 
decision theory, including standard graphical methods for decision analysis (i.e., 
decision trees and influence diagrams). In Section III, we will use these concepts 
for analyzing the scheme for making RP judgments in criminal cases.16 Critical 
discussion and conclusions will be presented in Section IV. 
 
III.  ELEMENTS OF CLASSIC DECISION THEORY AND THEIR APPLICATION IN THE LAW 
 
1. Formal development 
 
Over the decades since its publication in 1968, Kaplan’s foundational paper17 
on decision theory in the law has been mentioned in court cases18 and provided 
grounds for widespread discussion among legal scholars.19 Kaplan’s main result, 
also sometimes referred to as the “Kaplan formula”,20 is also featured in 
contemporary textbooks.21  
In a nutshell, a decision-theoretic analysis relies on the following notions: 
decisions (or courses of action), states of nature (i.e., what is actually the case) 
and decision consequences; we will further explain these terms in due course. The 
analysis also involves probabilities for uncertain states of nature, expressions of 
preferences (measured by utilities or losses) among possible decision 
 
15 The first formal decision-theoretic account of legal proof is widely attributed to John 
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stanford Law Review 1065–1092 
(1968). 
16 For a decision-theoretic analysis of relative plausibility decisions in civil cases, see Alex 
Biedermann & Joëlle Vuille, The Decisional Nature of Probability and Plausibility Assessments 
in Juridical Evidence and Proof, 16 International Commentary on Evidence 1–30 (2018). 
17 Id. 
18 E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. 
Parr, 516 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1975), at 464; California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa 
Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1981), at 93. 
19 E.g., Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s 
Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 557–585 
(1987); Bernard Grofman, Mathematical Models of Juror and Jury Decision-Making: The State of 
the Art, in: Bruce D. Sales (Ed.), The Trial Process 305–351 (1981); David H. Kaye, Clarifying 
the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 International 
Journal of Evidence & Proof 1–28 (1999); Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Michigan 
Law Review 1021–1057 (1977). 
20 Bell (1987) supra note 19, at 558. 
21 E.g., Dale A. Nance, The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence, 
and Tenacity of Belief, 2016, at 23; Richard D. Friedman, The Elements of Evidence (4th Ed.), 
2017, at 592 (presenting a more general formula). 
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consequences and expected values (i.e., expected utilities/losses) serving as 
expressions of the desirability of decisions. In combination, these elements 
represent an elaborate technical apparatus which naturally offers many angles of 
attack.22 For the time being, we shall ask our readers to bear with us and consider 
a basic illustration of how the above notions can be interpreted in legal contexts, 
keeping in mind that, as noted by Professor David Kaye, “no mathematical result 
is self-applying, and additional argument is necessary to bridge the gap from a 
general mathematical truth to a substantive application – in law as in any other 
domain.”23 
 Start by considering two competing assertions, one provided by the 
prosecution, denoted Hp, and one provided by the defense, denoted Hd. These two 
assertions, also sometimes called propositions, refer to a contested event of 
interest. Simply put, they stand for the possible states of nature: contested versions 
of the way in which the world is or has been. Because there is uncertainty about 
which state of nature (or, version of the contested event) is true, the trier of fact 
holds probabilities for Hp and Hd, denoted Pr(Hp) and Pr(Hd), respectively.24 Next, 
denote by dp (conviction) and dd (acquittal) the two25 possible courses of action 
(or, decision), one of which must be taken.26 We write Cij for the consequence that 
follows deciding di when in fact the proposition Hj is true. Clearly, for an 
omniscient observer, a decision is either accurate or erroneous: an accurate finding 
is one for the prosecution (defense), dp (dd), when in fact Hp (Hd) holds, otherwise 
it is erroneous. Most naturally, an accurate finding is preferred to an erroneous 
finding. Often, preferences among decision consequences are expressed (or, 
measured) using the concepts of utility or loss. For the purpose of the current 
analysis, we will use the notion of loss, written L(Cij). Loss is a positive number 
expressing the extent to which the decision-maker considers a given adverse 
consequence Cij undesirable; we will set the maximum loss that may be incurred 
to 1. Accurate findings are assigned a zero loss because it is considered that 
nothing is lost by making a correct determination. Such a loss function is also 
known in literature as a 0–1 loss function. 
At the time of making a decision in a criminal case, and at all other points in 
 
22 E.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Error of Expected Loss Minimization, 2 Law, Probability & Risk 
1–7 (2003); Allen & Pardo, supra note 2. 
23 Kaye (1999), supra note 19, at 27. 
24 Note that for shortness of notation, we do not include the conditioning on background 
information I and the entirety of the evidence E available to the decision-maker at the time when 
the decision needs to be made. A more complete notation for the probability of a proposition H 
would be Pr(H|I,E) where ‘|’ denotes ‘conditioned on’. 
25 Decision-theoretic analyses may be extended to more than two decisions. Also, there may 
be more than two propositions. 
26 Technically, though, fact-finders do not ‘find’ for the defendant in case of an acquittal in 
criminal adjudication, for the defendant is presumed innocent. The defendant’s default status is 
merely preserved. 
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time (future or past), it is not known with certainty which state of nature actually 
holds. For whatever side one will find, there is an inevitable possibility for one’s 
decision to lead to an erroneous consequence, depending on the probability of Hp 
and Hd, respectively. Stated otherwise, it is impossible to control the actual loss 
incurred. At best, one may consider the expected losses associated with the 
available decisions. The expected loss, written EL(di), is obtained as follows:  
EL(di)=L(Cip)Pr(Hp)+L(Cid)Pr(Hd).    (1) 
Briefly stated, the expected loss of a given decision is the sum of the actual 
losses of each decision consequence, ‘weighted’ by the respective probability of 
their occurrence.  
Consider, for example, the situation in which one decides for the prosecution 
by convicting, dp. The expected loss is EL(dp)=L(Cpp)Pr(Hp)+L(Cpd)Pr(Hd), where 
Cpp is a correct finding for the prosecution, and Cpd is an erroneous finding (i.e., 
wrongful conviction). It is immediately seen, however, that the loss assignment 
L(Cpp)=0 reduces the expected loss of decision dp to EL(dp)=L(Cpd)Pr(Hd). 
Similarly, the expected loss for the decision dd (acquittal) is given by 
EL(dd)=L(Cdp)Pr(Hp)+L(Cdd)Pr(Hd). A correct acquittal Cdd has zero loss, which 
reduces the expected loss for decision dd to EL(dd)=L(Cdp)Pr(Hp).  
The formalization introduced so far provides a way to assess the relative worth 
or merit of the competing decisions, but it does not yet direct one to a particular 
decision. It is at this point that decision-theory involves an additional notion, i.e. 
the notion of minimizing expected loss, used as a decision criterion. This criterion 
says to choose the decision that has the minimum expected loss.  
The reader can easily see that one cannot immediately say which decision has 
the minimum expected loss. This depends on the probabilities and assigned losses. 
Thus, let us examine in further detail the conditions under which the expected loss 
of, for example, decision dp is smaller (<) than the expected loss of dp, thus 
rendering dp prefereable to dp. This can be done by considering the following 
transformations: 
EL(dp) < EL(dd) 
L(Cpd)Pr(Hd) <  L(Cdp)Pr(Hp)  
Pr(Hp)/Pr(Hd) >  L(Cpd)/L(Cdp)    (2) 
Equation (2) is the decision-theoretic criterion that specifies the conditions 
under which finding for the prosecution is the better27 decision than an acquittal. 
In essence, Equation (2) amounts to a comparison between the odds in favor of Hp 
against Hd, shown on the left-hand side, and the relative losses associated with 
erroneous findings shown on the right-hand side (i.e., the loss of a wrongful 
conviction L(Cpd) and the loss of an erroneous acquittal L(Cdp)).28 
 
27 In this context, ‘better’ means having the smaller expected loss. 
28 Equation (2) can also be found, in similar form, in statistical literature, e.g., James O. 
Berger, Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis (2nd Ed.) 1985, at 164; José M. 
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Some interesting properties of Equation (2) are well known among legal 
scholars. Suppose, for example, that wrongly deciding for either side is considered 
equally undesirable. This is commonly assumed for the standard civil case. Thus, 
L(Cpd)=L(Cdp) and Equation (2) is satisfied whenever Pr(Hp)>Pr(Hd), i.e. when 
Pr(Hp)>0.5.29 This limiting value is commonly associated with the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. It is also readily seen that this limiting value increases, 
whenever the ratio L(Cpd)/L(Cdp) increases, thus accounting for higher standards 
of proof, as required in criminal cases. Table 1 summarizes some illustrative 
examples.30  
 
L(Cpd) L(Cdp) Loss ratio Limiting value Pr(Hp) 
1 1 1 0.5 
1 0.5 2 0.66 
1 0.1 10 0.91 
1 0.01 100 0.99 
1 0.001 1000 0.999 
 
Table 1: Illustration of the minimum probability (column 4) necessary to ensure that the 
expected loss for deciding for the prosecution, dp, is smaller than the expected loss for deciding 
dd (acquittal), given different loss ratios (column 3). A loss ratio x > 1 means that the loss 
incurred by an erroneous decision dp (column 1) is x times greater than the loss incurred by an 
erroneous decision dd (column 2). We assume that an erroneous finding for the prosecution, i.e. 
a wrongful conviction, Cpd, is the overall worst consequence and thus assigned the loss 1.     
 
As an aside, note that because Equation (2) “works both ways”31, it is also 
possible to consider the limiting value Pr(Hp) first, i.e. the standard of proof, and 
then work out the corresponding loss ratio. This amounts to reading Table 1 from 
right to left. 
 
2. The notion of error 
 
An issue that is often raised in connection with verdicts is the notion of error, in 
particular notions such as the risk of error, the allocation of the risk of error (to 
parties) and the regulation and monitoring of errors (e.g., in terms of their total 
 
Bernardo & Adrian F. M. Smith, Bayesian Theory (2nd Ed.) 2000, at 391; Giovanni Parmigiani, 
Modeling in Medical Decision Making, A Bayesian Approach, 2002, at 87; Giovanni Parmigiani 
& Lourdes Inoue, Decision Theory: Principles and Approaches, 2009, at 139.  
29 See, e.g., Kaye (1999), supra note 19, at 1, for a statement of the same result, but using 
utilities instead of losses. 
30 See Terry Connolly, Decision Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous 
Acquittals, 11 Law and Human Behavior 101–112 (1987) for a detailed empirical investigation 
and discussion of value assignments for decision consequences, including unusual hypothetical 
situations such as the assignment of a higher utility to an erroneous acquittal than to a correct 
acquittal. 
31 Bell (1987), supra note 19, at 561. 
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number). There are two distinct but related perspectives through which the notion 
of error is commonly discussed. In one perspective, the term ‘errors’ – plural – 
refers to the number (or, proportion) of cases in which erroneous verdicts are 
issued. This may be of interest when focusing on the functioning of a legal system 
as a whole. Errors can be of two types: convicting an innocent defendant (also 
sometimes referred to as ‘false alarm’, false positive or type 1 error), and wrongly 
acquitting a defendant (type 2 error).32 The number or proportion of such 
erroneous findings across multiple distinct cases, though real, is not empirically 
tractable.33 In another perspective, the focus is on the given case at hand. Here, at 
most one error can be incurred, either an erroneous finding for the prosecution or 
an erroneous acquittal. This much is rather uncontroversial.  
The distinction between the two perspectives is important, however, because 
statements about the latter are prone to be carried over inappropriately to the 
former, especially regarding the notions of probability and expected loss 
introduced in the previous section. We thus emphasise that the notion of 
probability is understood here as the decision-maker’s assessment that a given 
party’s version for a particular case at hand is true (denoted, Pr(H)). In turn, the 
notion of expected loss, computed on the basis of such a case-specific probability, 
expresses only – as the term literally conveys – the decision maker’s expectation 
of loss associated with a particular decision. This does not amount to a statement 
about the actual number (or proportion) of errors, and their minimisation, across 
multiple distinct cases.34 Rather, the expected loss minimisation decision criterion 
(or, rule) entails the following aspects:  
• An error is an adverse decision consequence Cij that results from 
deciding di when in fact the proposition Hj is true, for i,j={p,d} as 
defined in §III.1, and i≠j. 
• What is being targeted is not, however, the possible errors as such, but 
the characterisation of their undesirability using the notion of loss, 
L(Cij). What is more, the focus is not on the actual loss, associated with 
a given error (i.e., an adverse decision consequence), but only the 
expected loss. 
Thus, the loss assigned to a particular decision consequence, L(Cij), is to be 
distinguished from the expected loss associated with a particular decision, EL(di): 
 
32 This terminology is based on considering the defense’s case as the null hypothesis and 
defining a type I error the false rejection of a null hypothesis (e.g., Grofman (1981), supra note 19, 
at 308, and Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale Law Journal 
1254–1279 (2013), at 1260). 
33 Paul Roberts & Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd. Ed., 2010, at 226. 
34 For a detailed analysis and discussion see Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between 
Blackstone-Like Error Rates and Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 Law & Social Inquiry 95–
132 (1996), and previously Michael O. Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law: Studies in the 
Application of Mathematical Probability and Statistics to Legal Problems 65–78 (1978). 
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the crucial distinction here – and a cornerstone of decision analysis35 – is the 
distinction between decisions and decision consequences (or, decision outcomes). 
Let us recall that because there is uncertainty about the actual outcome of a 
particular decision di, one cannot consider the actual loss, but only expected loss, 
given the sum of the probability-discounted losses assigned to each decision 
consequence, including both accurate and erroneous consequences.36 So, each 
decision has its own expected loss which provides a criterion for their comparison. 
Minimising expected loss then means to select the decision that presents, in the 
view of the decision-maker, the minimum expected loss. 
For the remaining parts of this paper, it is therefore important not to equate the 
limiting probabilities related to particular loss ratios for the individual case 
through Equation 2, as summarised in Table 1, with error ratios across many cases. 
For example, applying a threshold probability of 0.5 does not mean that, across 
many cases, the ratio of false convictions to false acquittals will be 1 to 1. Instead, 
the loss ratio 1 expresses that, in the case at hand, the decision-maker is equally 
concerned about each type of error that may be incurred. 
Statements regarding the number of correct and erroneous verdicts, and hence 
error ratios, would we require knowledge about the proportion of meritorious 
cases that arrive at trial. Further, assumptions would need to be made about the 
distributions of the decision-makers’ probabilities regarding the parties’ versions 
at the end of each trial, among the two types of cases arriving at trial (i.e., 
meritorious and non-meritorious cases). Legal literature presents several 
discussions of these matters, but it is generally acknowledged that they are 
essentially hypothetical,37 and thus not further pursued here. We will also take no 
position regarding the definition of social policy goals, e.g. whether they should 
be based on considerations of actual errors across multiple cases38 or on value 
judgments for case-specific outcomes. 
 
3. Decision trees and influence diagrams 
 
For readers who are less at ease with formulaic developments as presented in 
 
35 As noted, e.g., by Ronald A. Howard (1 Bulleting of the American Mathematical Society 
784–787 (1979), at 786) in his review of LaValle (1978), supra note 1, and in Ronald A. Howard, 
Decision Analysis in Systems Engineering, in: The Principles and Applications of Decision 
Analysis, Vol. 1: General Collection, Ronald A. Howard & James E. Matheson (Eds.), 59–93 
(1983): “We all want good outcomes. (...) Everyone wants a good rather than a bad (...) – the 
question is how do we get there. The only thing you can control is the decision and how you go 
about making that decision. That is the key” (at 92–93). 
36 See also Equation (1). 
37 For example, Kaye (1999), supra note 19, insists on that the distributions of decision-
makers’ probabilities across the two types of cases, meritorious and non-meritorious, are 
“fantasies” (at 24). 
38 As noted above, this is an unknowable factor. 
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§III.1 we now introduce two graphical concepts, decision trees and influence 
diagrams. These concepts provide a rigorous graphical mapping of the various 
components involved in the formal analysis and the relationships among those 
components. Besides decisions and states of nature, these graphical models 
incorporate probabilities, losses and expected losses in clear and transparent ways, 
thus helping to avoid misunderstandings. We insist that, from a decision-theoretic 
point of view, nothing new is introduced. We are only providing a graphical 
translation of the decision-analytic apparatus presented so far in exclusively 
formulaic terms. Readers well acquainted with decision tress and influence 
diagrams may skip this section. We shall look at decision trees first because 
influence diagrams are a more compact representation of the same concepts.39 
 
a. Decision trees 
 
Decision trees have a long and well documented history in the fields of 
statistics and applied areas such as the analysis of business decisions.40 They are 
also of interest to lawyers who seek to analyse questions arising in professional 
practice, in particular during the management of cases for clients (e.g., strategic 
counselling in procedures for filing lawsuits).41 Here we provide a sketch of 
 
39 Ronald A. Howard, From Influence to Relevance to Knowledge, in: Robert M. Oliver & 
James Q. Smith (Eds.), Influence Diagrams, Belief Nets and Decision Analysis, 3–23 (1990); Jim 
Q. Smith, Decision Analysis: A Bayesian Approach, 1988, at 64. 
40 E.g., John Aitchison, Choice Against Chance, An Introduction to Statistical Decision 
Theory, 1970, at 202–213; Rex Brown, Rational Choice and Judgment: Decision Analysis of the 
Decider, 2005, at 62–64; Simon French, Readings in Decision Analysis, 1989, at 27–29; Simon 
French, John Maule & Nadia Papamichail, Decision Behaviour, Analysis and Support, 2009, at 
13–21; C. Jackson Grayson, Decisions Under Uncertainty: Drilling Decisions by Oil and Gas 
Operators, 1960, at 323–336 (using the term “Information flow diagram”); Dennis V. Lindley, 
Making Decisions, 1971, at 140–163; James E. Matheson & Ronald A. Howard, An Introduction 
to Decision Analysis, in: Howard & Matheson (1983), supra note 35, 17–55, at 47–51; George E. 
Monahan, Management Decision Making, 2000, at 451–525; Parmigiani & Inoue (2009), supra 
note 28, at 126–131; Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis, Introductory Lectures on Choices under 
Uncertainty, 1968; Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: A Personal Account of How it Got Started 
and Evolved, 50 Operations Research (2000), at 179–185; Jim Q. Smith (1988), supra note 39, at 
10–22; Michael D. Resnik, Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory, 1990, at 17–19; Robert 
Schlaifer, Analysis of Decisions Under Uncertainty, 1969 (using the term “decision diagram”, at 
37–38); Howard Thomas, Decision Theory and the Manager, 1972, at 43–75; Stephen R. Watson 
& Dennis M. Buede, Decision Synthesis: The Principles and Practice of Decision Analysis, 1987, 
at 36; Robert L. Winkler, Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision, 1972, at 219–295; 
Detlof von Winterfeldt & Ward Edwards, Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research, 1986, at 
63–89.  
41 E.g., Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Problem Solving, Decision Making, and 
Professional Judgment, A Guide for Lawyers and Policymakers, 2010, at 462–473; David P. 
Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator’s Tool, 1 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 113–137 
(1996); Howell E. Jackson, Louis Kaplow, Steven M. Shavell, W. Kip Viscusi, David Cope, 
Analytical Methods for Lawyers, 2003, at 1–33; Jeffrey M. Senger, Decision Analysis in 
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decision trees using the simple decision example from §III.1, involving two 
competing assertions Hp and Hd provided by the prosecution and defense, 
respectively, and two possible courses of action, dp (conviction) and dd (acquittal).  
Figure 1 presents the decision tree for this example.42 A decision tree is charted 
horizontally from left, where the trunk (represented by a square) is, to right. The 
branches that grow out of the trunk correspond to the courses of action available 
to the decision maker. Here, there are two branches, representing the two decisions 
dp and dd.43 When pursuing a branch, one arrives at a chance node (also called 
chance point), presented by a circle. The branches that emanate out of these nodes 
represent the possible states of nature, or events, about which the decision-maker 
is uncertain at the time when a decision needs to be made. In the example here, 
there are two possible states of nature, denoted Hp and Hd, corresponding to the 
two competing versions presented by the parties. The probability associated with 
each of these two states of nature, Pr(Hj), is indicated below the respective branch. 
Following the branches further to the right leads to terminal points, representing 
decision consequences Cij. For example, following the decision branch dp (finding 
for the prosecution), and then the Hd-branch, leads to the consequence Cpd (a false 
conviction). Associated with every consequence Cij is a loss L(Cij), shown on the 
the far right-hand side. Sometimes, end points are represented by triangles or 
diamond-shaped notes. For simplicity, we leave this graphical notation aside. 
 
 
Figure 1: Decision tree for the current example in which dp and dd denote two available actions, 
finding for the prosecution and acquittal, respectively. These two decisions are represented as 
branches that emanate from the squared decision node shown on the left. Circled nodes 
 
Negotiation, 87 Marquette Law Review 723–735 (2004); Marc B. Victor, The Proper Use of 
Decision Analysis to Assist Litigation Strategy, 40 The Business Lawyer 617–929 (1985). 
42 Trees similar in general structure are given in Larry Laudan & Harry D. Saunders, Re-
Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus About the Utilities of Trial 
Outcomes, 7 International Commentary on Evidence 1–34 (2009), at 5, and Reid Hastie & Robyn 
M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World, 2001, at 35.  
43 More generally, note that there can be more than two branches, depending on the number 
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represent chance points from which branches emanate to the right, representing uncertain states 
of nature (here: competing assertions Hp and Hd of the prosecution and defense, respectively). 
Decision consequences Cij, resulting from deciding di when in fact Hj holds, and associated 
losses L(Cij) are shown on the far right hand-side of the tree, at its terminal points. Expected 
losses are indicated underneath the chance nodes. The expected loss of the optimal decision, 
i.e. the decision which has the minimum expected loss, is indicated below the decision node. 
Note that in a full analysis, the decision branch that does not have the minimum expected loss 
is double barred.  
 
It is worth noting that the horizontal tree structure reflects several fundamental 
properties of decision-making under uncertainty, both in law and other areas of 
application: 
• The decision-maker has control44 only over the decision-branches that 
emanate from the trunk (squared node). She has no control, however, 
over the branches (representing states of nature) that grow out 
rightward from the (circled) chance nodes, and hence over decision 
consequences. It is unknown which state of nature represented by the 
latter branches actually holds, which is why the decision-maker can – 
at best – entertain probabilities for those states.  
• The flow from the left to the right expresses a natural order in the sense 
that no decision consequence Cij is incurred as long as no decision is 
di is made. 
So far, our decision problem has been described in its structure, but it has not 
yet been fully analysed. The decision tree merely displays all the possible ‘routes’ 
through which our actions and related consequences may unroll. The analysis, in 
turn, focuses on the computation of expected values, based on the assigned 
probabilities and losses. This is called ‘rolling back’ or backward analysis: starting 
from the terminal branches, expectations are computed at the chance points. For 
example, the expectation at the circled chance node of the upper branch in Figure 
1 is computed according to Equation (1): EL(dp)=L(Cpp)Pr(Hp)+L(Cpd)Pr(Hd). 
This value is the sum of the probability weighted losses of the two possible 
outcomes following decision dp (i.e., finding for the prosecution). An analogous 
computation is performed for the chance point in the lower branch. Next, moving 
further back to the left, we reach the base (squared decision node). Below this 
node we write the expected loss of the optimal decision dopt, which is understood 
here as the decision di, i={p,d}, which has the minimum expected loss. 
This analysis conveys an insightful point: starting on the far right-hand side 
means to consider, first, the elements to happen last (i.e., decision consequences); 
in turn, the elements to occur first (i.e., decisions) are considered last. In the words 
of Lindley:  
“The point is succinctly put. We cannot decide what to do today until 
 
44 “The only thing you can control is the decision (....)” (Howard (1983), supra note 35, at 93). 
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we have decided what to do with the tomorrows that today’s decisions 
might bring. This is an unfortunate, but indisputable, conclusion.”45   
This also seems a fair precept for legal applications as it is widely held that 
decision-makers ought to have a clear view about and appreciation of the possible 
decision consequences, especially related value judgments, prior to deciding. 
 
b. Influence diagrams 
 
While decision trees lay out, from left to right, a natural time flow of the 
decisions and subsequent contingencies, influence diagrams are more compact 
representations that concentrate on reflecting the assumed relationships 
(dependencies) among the constituting elements of the decision problem. 
However, decision trees and influence diagrams are not opposing concepts, but 
complementary.46 For example, a decision tree may be used to show the evaluation 
of an influence diagram, whereas an influence diagram may be used to synthesise 
a decision analysis where the decision tree becomes too ‘bushy’, a problem readily 
encountered when the number of possibilities that may result from decisions and 
chance events increases. 
Historically, literature on influence diagrams can be traced back to research 
conducted in the 1970s in the context of formal analyses of political conflicts and 
the use intelligence information gathered by governmental agencies.47 Theoretical 
background of influence diagrams has mainly been published in the 1980s,48 
available also in more contemporary textbooks in both technical49 and applied 
formats.50 
 
45 Lindley (1971), supra note 40, at 148. 
46 French, Maule & Papamichail (2009), supra note 40, at 21. 
47 Ronald A. Howard, James E. Matheson, Miley W. (Lee) Merkhofer, Allen C. Miller & D. 
Warner North, Comment on Influence Diagram Retrospective, 3 Decision Analysis 117–119 
(2005).  
48 E.g., Ronald A. Howard & James E. Matheson, Influence Diagrams, in: The Principles and 
Applications of Decision Analysis, Vol. 2: Professional Collection, Ronald A. Howard & James 
E. Matheson (Eds.), 1983, at 719–762; Robert M. Oliver & James Q. Smith (Eds.), Influence 
Diagrams, Belief Nets and Decision Analysis, 1990 (Proceedings of the Conference entitled 
‘Influence Diagrams for Decision Analysis, Influence and Prediction’, Engineering Systems 
Research Center, University of California at Berkeley, 1988); Ross D. Shachter, Evaluating 
Influence Diagrams, 34 Operations Research (1986), at 871–882. 
49 E.g., Robert G. Cowell, A. Philip Dawid, Steffen L. Lauritzen & David J. Spiegelhalter, 
Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems, 1999, at 155–188; Uffe B. Kjærulff & Anders B. 
Madsen, Bayesian networks and Influence Diagrams, A Guide to Construction and Analysis, 2008, 
at 74–91; Finn V. Jensen & Thomas D. Nielsen, Bayesian Networks and Decision Graphs, Second 
Edition, 2007, at 279–428; Richard E. Neapolitan, Learning Bayesian Networks, 2004, at 252–
265.  
50 E.g., Robert T. Clemen & Terence Reilly, Making Hard Decisions with Decision Tools, 
2001, 52–69; Monahan (2000), supra note 40, at 11–13; Kevin B. Korb & Ann E. Nicholson, 
Bayesian Artificial Intelligence, Second Edition, 2011; Kevin Murphy, Machine Learning: A 
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As in decision trees, influence diagrams represent decisions and uncertain 
events (also sometimes called aleatory variables) by squares and circles, 
respectively. A third type of node, called value node, is diamond shaped and used 
to quantify the relative (un-)desirability of decision consequences using, for 
example, utilities or losses.51 The nodes in a network are connected with arcs 
which can have different meanings. For example, an arc between two chance 
nodes in a network fragment A→B indicates that the outcome of node A can 
influence the probabilities associated with B. In turn, arcs from decision and 
chance nodes to value nodes are called functional links. They express the fact that 
the possible consequences of a decision functionally depend on the possible states 
of nature and on the choice that is made among the possible decisions. The 
semantics of influence diagrams involve many more subtleties that go beyond the 
scope of this paper. We illustrate some further aspects directly in terms of an 
example.   
The influence diagram corresponding to currently discussed example 
involving two decisions and two states of nature consists of three nodes connected 
as follows # → $ ← &. Compared to the decision tree shown in Figure 1, one can 
see that there is only one node H (with two states Hp and Hd) for the chance event, 
and one node L that contains the loss function L(di,Hj), for di and Hj with i,j={p,d}. 
This graph is considerably more compact, compared to decision trees, and 
represents the structural dependencies among the main constituting elements of 
the decision problem under study. It does not represent the temporal order of how 
decisions may be made and consequences may occur. Note also that the presence 
and direction of a particular arc is as informative as the absence of an arc. For 
example, there is no arc pointing from the decision node D to the chance node H 
because, in our example, the decision-maker’s probability for the states of nature 
Hp and Hd are not affected by the decision made (i.e., whether deciding dp or dd).52 
Although definitionally highly precise, influence diagrams are very flexible in 
the sense that the same problem can be represented by different structures and still 
lead to the same output. Structural variation may result, for example, from 
differences in the level of detail at which a decision problem is represented. Figure 
2 shows an example of an alternative structure for the problem under study. 
Instead of conditioning the value node L directly on the decision node D and the 
chance node H, an intermediate node C is introduced. Its states represent all the 
consequences Cij that result from decisions di and states of nature Hj. Associated 
 
Probabilistic Perspective, 2012, at 330–334; Stuart Russell & Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence, 
A Modern Approach, Third Edition, 2010, 626–636 (using the term “decision network”); Franco 
Taroni, Alex Biedermann, Silvia Bozza, Paolo Garbolino & Colin Aitken, Bayesian Networks for 
Probabilistic Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic Science, 2014. 
51 Different scales may be used and, in some applications, it may be suitable to quantify costs, 
gains and rewards etc. directly in monetary terms. 
52 This may be different, for example, in a medical context where the probability of a patient’s 
future health status may be affected by the decisions made regarding medical treatment. 
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with the node C is a node probability table. It contains the logical values 0 and 1. 
For example, the state Cpp is true and hence assigned the value 1, when dp and Hp 
hold, and false (value 0) for all other combinations of di and Hj. In turn, the node 
L contains the loss L assigned to each possible consequence Cij.  
The influence diagram in Figure 2 may be preferred to the diagram # → $ ←
& when there is a need to express a clear distinction between consequences and 
the valuation of consequences. Regarding their output, however, the two models 
are equivalent: they both provide the expected loss for decisions dp and dd at the 
node D, in agreement with the formulaic result Equation (1), given the same 
probability distribution Pr(H) and loss function L(·).  
 
 
Figure 2: Alternative influence diagram for a decision problem with two decisions dp and dd, 
and two states of nature Hp and Hd. For each combination of a decision di and a state of nature 
Hj, i,j={p,d}, a consequence Cij is obtained. The states of the node C represent the possible 
consequences. The table associated with the value node L assigns a loss to each consequence 
Cij, written L(Cij). 
 
So far, our presentation of influence diagrams focused on static aspects, and 
the critical reader may ask how this graphical formalism may be useful in 
furthering the understanding of the decision theoretic concepts introduced so far. 
Whilst, at first sight, the elaborate graphical language may seem disproportionate 
with respect to the ‘simple’ output of the expected loss, corresponding to Equation 
(1), it is important to keep in mind that influence diagrams will be helpful for 
keeping track of the decision-theoretic treatment of more complex decision 
problems, for which purely formulaic developments or even decision trees will 
become too demanding. Translating non-formal arguments and lines of reasoning 
into a graphical representation using influence diagrams also helps to examine the 
logical structure of concepts, and their relationships, which are tasks that may be 
difficult to achieve without a formal framework. It is precisely this property of 
influence diagrams that we will exploit in later sections in order to examine the 
relationship between decision-theoretic and RP arguments. 
Critics may also invoke that both decision trees and influence diagrams 
provide no solution to the fundamental problem of how to assign probabilities and 
D H
L
C: Cpp Cpd Cdp Cdd







H: Hp Hd Hp Hd
Cpp 1 0 0 0
Cpd 0 1 0 0
Cdp 0 0 1 0
Cdd 0 0 0 1
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values for decision consequences.53 This is correct, of course, though it needs to 
be emphasized that the modelling frameworks do not claim to provide solutions 
for these challenges, nor do we intend to solve them in this paper. Rather, our 
premise is that decision makers are uncertain about real-world events and that 
they do have preferences among decision consequences. Consequently, decision 
makers are required to give an account of how they logically deal with these 
notions, which is a question in its own right, independently of how to quantify 
those notions in the first place. Specifically, as shown through Equation (2), 
numerical quantification is not a necessary requirement for decision theory to 
provide relevant insight: comparisons of (qualitative) orders of magnitude are 
sufficient. 
 
IV.  STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE RELATIVE PLAUSIBILITY AND 
DECISION-THEORETIC ACCOUNTS FOR CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION 
 
1. Influence diagram for relative plausibility decisions 
 
The question we now seek to investigate is (1) whether, and if so, how, the RP 
scheme54 can be stated and analysed in terms of the graphical formalisms 
introduced in the previous section, and (2) which structural relationships between 
the RP and decision-theoretic accounts such analyses can reveal. This endeavour 
may seem incompatible with RP, because it is an explicitly non-formalistic 
concept. Notwithstanding, the understanding of an assessment or judgment of RP 
as a decision55 should allow, at least in principle, a decision-theoretic analysis to 
be developed. Proponents of RP, we suggest, will agree that RP arguments should 
conform to principles of logical consistency. 
To capture RP assessments using the language of decision theory, it is helpful 
to start with what the decision-maker is in control of: the RP decisions. As noted 
in §II, the decision-maker judges the plausibility of the parties’ competing 
accounts. This means that, in essence, the decision-maker must decide which 
plausibility assessments most suitably address the parties’ cases. This looks like 
there being two distinct decisions, one regarding the plausibility of the 
prosecution’s account, and one regarding the defence’s account. In essence, 
however, the plausibility judgments are – as their name suggests – relative, that is 
a given account’s plausibility is not assessed in isolation, but against its 
competitor. Thus, RP can be regarded as an aggregate assessment. It represents a 
 
53 Stated otherwise, in decision theory, it is assumed that the decision maker can express 
probabilities and utilities (losses), for which the theory then provides instructions for their coherent 
combination. 
54 Throughout what follows, we mean RP as advocated by Professors Allen and Pardo (supra 
note 2). 
55 This assumption has been justified in §II. 
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consideration that comes before the actual verdict. In this sense, there is, overall, 
a staged decision process, consisting of a (relative) plausibility assessment, 
followed by a verdict. 
Based on the above, we identify the following three decisions available to the 
decision-maker in a typical criminal case: 
d1 : The prosecution (P) has no plausible account (PA).56 
d2 : P has a PA, and the defence (D) also has a PA. 
d3 : P has a PA, and D has no PA. 
While decisions d2 and d3 clearly convey the compound nature of RP 
assessments, decision d1 does not explicitly mention the defence’s account. That 
is, decision d1 reflects a situation in which the decision-maker considers that the 
prosecution was not able to present a sufficiently thorough account.57 In practice, 
it is reasonable to consider, in accordance with the explanatory dimensions of RP, 
that the sufficiency of the prosecution case is being considered in relative 
comparison to the ordinary human experience of the trier of fact. This experience 
is the foundation for the interpretation of the criminal standard of proof. In the 
course of trial, influences on that experience derive from a positively presented 
defence account or defence challenges to prosecution evidence. In reviewing the 
evidence presented in conclusion of the trial, only if the prosecution has a 
plausible account, is there a practical impetus for the trier of fact to consider the 
nature of the defence account. It is important here not to place the prosecution and 
defence accounts in relative comparison because that would misconstrue the legal 
task. Both in law and practice, however, it may be observed that a plausible 
prosecution account is a precondition to any need for the trier of fact to separately 
consider the plausibility of an account proffered by a defendant.  
In Professors Allen’s and Pardo’s RP theory, decision d2 leads to an acquittal, 
and only decision d3 leads to a guilty verdict.58 A plausible account by the defence, 
in their scheme, can raise a reasonable doubt if it is compatible with innocence, 
not disproven or otherwise eliminated.59 In summary, thus, there are two 
decisions, d1 and d2, that lead to an acquittal, and only one decision, d3, that is able 
to warrant a conviction. 
In terms of an influence diagram, the relationship between RP decisions and 
verdicts can be represented as shown in Figure 3. The node RP has three states as 
 
56 We acknowledge that in a ‘typical’ criminal case, the prosecution will have (almost by 
definition) a plausible account, at least from their own point of view, because otherwise there 
would not be a trial. This is, of course, not a conceptual problem, but a doctrinal and practical one. 
Jurisdictions have safety measures in place to prevent trials when the evidence against the 
defendant is weak or implausible, in order to raise efficiency (and save public money). Here, we 
include d1 as a decision in order to ensure generality of the argument. 
57 Unlike RP theory, conventional explanations of the criminal process would consider 
sufficiency as relative to the criminal standard of proof in law. 
58 Allen & Pardo, supra note 2, at 27. 
59 Id. 
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defined above. They present all possible plausibility statements available to the 
decision-maker. Exactly one of the options needs to be chosen, and choosing one 
of them excludes the remaining options. The arc pointing from the node RP to the 
node D accounts for two aspects: a temporal order and a contingency. 
Chronologically, RP assessments precede verdicts. At the same time, they place a 
constraint on verdicts, which is expressed by the table associated with the node D. 
Following the constraints defined above, decisions d1 and d2 cannot warrant a 
verdict dp in favour of the prosecution, but lead to an acquittal (decision dd): this 
is expressed by the values 0 (assigned to dp) and 1 (assigned to dd) in the first two 
columns. Column three contains the values 1 (assigned to dp) and 0 (assigned to 
dd). This expresses the view that a verdict in favour of the prosecution applies in 
a case in which the decision maker considers that the defence does not have 
plausible account (d3). The node RP has no entering arcs, which reflects the idea 
that the decision-maker is not formally constrained in any way by other 
considerations. Though, in theory, the RP account acknowledges a wide range of 
considerations to inform plausibility assessments, these considerations are not 
formally structured at this stage of development of RP theory. Hence, they also 
have no formal representation in our influence diagram. In combination, these 
features reflect the highly liberal nature of RP theory. 
 
 
Figure 3: Influence diagram for the relationship between RP decisions, represented by the node 
RP, and verdicts (node D), i.e. decisions dp and dd in favor of the prosecution P and defence D, 
respectively. RP decisions are states of the node RP in the form of statements as to whether P 
and/or D has a plausible account (PA).  
 
The influence diagram in Figure 4 is a minimalistic model in the sense that it 
only involves two decisions. It provides no guidance on how to choose a particular 
RP decision. It also incorporates no case specific characteristics. In essence, the 
RP model only specifies the possible decisions and their relationships. 
This is different for standard decision-theoretic analyses where the aim is to 
look beyond decision points and investigate the parts of decision paths that are not 
under control of the decision-maker. This means to focus on uncertain events and 
uncertain decision consequences. Specifically, with respect to the influence 
diagram shown in Figure 3, one may ask how to provide a criterion for choosing 
among the decisions di, i={1,2,3}, in view of the possible decision consequences, 
their probability and relative adversity. The modelling language of influence 
diagrams is ideally suited to investigate this question. We address it in the next 
section. 
 
d1: P has no PA.
d2: P has a PA, and D has a PA.
d3: P has a PA, and D has no PA.
RP D
RP: d1 d2 d3
D: dp 0 0 1
dd 1 1 0
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2. An extended influence diagram for relative plausibility decisions 
 
a. General model structure 
 
So far, we have developed two influence diagrams in isolation, one for the 
classic decision-theoretic account according to Kaplan (§III.3.b), and one for the 
RP account (§IV.1). At this point, these diagrams are disconnected, which raises 
the question whether there is a way to logically relate them to each other. This 
question is motivated by the understanding that the two concepts – optimality 
according to the decision-theoretic account and ‘best explanation’ in the RP 
account – appear to characterise distinct, but related aspects of the same overall 
process toward a decision regarding ultimate issues (i.e., verdict). 
Inspection of the two influence diagrams suggests a natural way for combining 
them. In fact, both influence diagram fragments share D as a common node. A 
combined model can thus be proposed by retaining only one node D, as illustrated 
in Figure 4. The resulting model 4(iii) exhibits a series of entirely reasonable 
qualitative properties. For example, consider that the loss is still related to only 
the node C, modelling the decision consequences. The node L is not directly 
impacted by the decision-maker’s plausibility assessment (node RP). The same 
holds for the decision consequences (node C): the scope of accurate and erroneous 
decision consequences is strictly a function of the verdict (node D) and the true 
state of nature (node H) only. This suggests that there should be no direct arc 
between the nodes RP and C. Notwithstanding, the decision-maker’s plausibility 
assessment is indirectly connected to the node modelling the consequences of the 
ultimate decisions: this connection is made through the path RP→D→C. In 
addition, because the table associated with the node D (see Figure 4) defines a 
clear deterministic relationship between the decision nodes RP and D, it becomes 
possible to think about the decision consequences (node C) as a function of RP, 
and vice-versa: core features of the decision-theoretic sub-model, in particular 
probabilities for states of nature and losses for decision consequences, allow one 
to provide a measure to qualify and compare the various RP-decisions. The latter 
aspect is further explored below. 
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account, (ii), through the common node D. The combined influence diagram, (iii), contains only 
a single node D. Definitions of all nodes and node tables are as given in Figures 2 and 3.  
 
b. Analysis of model properties 
 
To study the properties of the joint influence diagram (Figure 4(iii)) in further 
detail, consider a situation in which the probabilities for the two competing 
accounts are Pr(Hp)=0.3 and Pr(Hd)=0.7, respectively. Suppose further that an 
erroneous finding for the prosecution is the overall worst consequence, and thus 
is assigned the loss L(Cpd)=1. An erroneous finding for the defence is considered 
ten times less adverse, and hence is assigned the loss L(Cdp)=0.1. The most 
desirable consequences are correct findings for the prosecution (Cpp) and an 
accurate acquittal (Cdd): they are assigned zero loss, expressing the idea that 
nothing is ‘lost’ by taking an accurate decision.60 
In the classic decision-theoretic account, the optimal decision is dd (Acquit) 
because from Equation (1) it is readily seen that the expected loss for this decision, 
EL(dd), is 0.03, which is smaller than the expected loss for the decision dp 
(Convict), EL(dp)=0.7.61 This is intuitively reasonable, given that the defence’s 
account is taken to be considerably more probable than the prosecution’s account. 
We can represent this decision analysis as shown in Figure 5, within the wider 
context of a decision-theoretic account of RP. As mentioned previously, RP 
assessments precede ultimate decisions and thus extend the decision problem to 
what is called a two-stage decision problem. As an example, suppose we focus on 
the decision d1 (P has no PA),62 a decision that looks well in line with the low 
probability of the prosecution’s account. Since the RP decision scheme stipulates 
an acquittal in a case in which the prosecution has no plausible account (d1), the 
expected loss EL(dd: Acquit)=0.03 of decision dd (Acquit) is carried over to the d1 
decision branch.63 Stated otherwise, we have obtained a decision-theoretic 
qualification of RP decisions. This is an important result precisely because it 
provides a criterion for comparing rival RP statements (i.e., decisions). 
In isolation, however, the expected loss EL(d1: P has no PA) is little 
informative. The crucial question is how it compares to the expected losses of the 
alternative decisions d2 (P has PA, and D has PA) and d3 (P has PA, and D has no 
PA). We can readily investigate these questions by inspecting the decision tree 
 
60 The reader may choose other values, but should keep in mind that the general idea is to 
suppose that the decision-maker holds stronger beliefs in Hd than in Hp being true, so that Pr(Hd)> 
Pr(Hp), and prefers accurate over erroneous decision consequences, thus assigning loss values 
accordingly. 
61 In fact, according to Equation 1, EL(dp)=L(dpp)Pr(Hp)+ L(dpp)Pr(Hd)=0·0.3+1·0.7=0.7, and 
EL(dd)=L(ddp)Pr(Hp)+ L(ddd)Pr(Hd)=0.1·0.3+0·0.7=0.03. 
62 The analysis for other RP decisions is developed later in this section. 
63 As further explained below, the dp-branch is not sketched because it is not an admissible 
decision under d1. 
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Figure 5: Decision tree for the three RP decisions d1 (P has no PA), d2 (P has PA, D has PA) 
and d3 (P has PA, D has no PA), followed by decisions dd (Acquit) and dp (Convict), 
respectively. Definitions of all nodes and notation are as given in Figures 2 and 3. Probabilities 
are noted below branches, and expected values below nodes. The branch of the non-optimal 
decision (i.e., the decision that does not minimize expected loss) is double-barred. 
 
Note that the branch corresponding to the decision d2 (P has PA, and D has 
PA) has the same structure as the branch for the decision d1 (P has no PA). The 
reason for this is that, as for the decision d1 (P has no PA), RP theory calls for an 
acquittal in a case in which decision d2 (P has PA, and D has PA) is made. The 
expected loss of an acquittal has already been determined as 0.03, which is thus 
carried over to the decision branch d2. Although decisions d1 and d2 express 
fundamentally different views about the RP of the parties’ cases, their expected 
losses are the same: this is because both RP decisions (d1 and d2) lead to an 
acquittal, which determines the applicable expected loss.  
The third branch, corresponding to the decision d3 (P has PA, and D has no 
PA), is interesting in the context of this example because, in general, RP theory 
stipulates that when the prosecution has a plausible account, but not the defence, 
then this is a case of conviction (dp). Could the decision-theoretic characterization 
of decision d3 show that this is not an optimal decision in this case? We ask this 
because, after all, the prosecution’s case in our example is considered to have a 
lower probability than that of the defence. Under these circumstances, the 
expected loss for a conviction (decision dp) is: 
RP
D C
Cdp L(Cdp) = 0.1







Cdp L(Cdp) = 0.1






d2: P has PA, D has PA
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 EL(dp) = L(dpp)Pr(Hp) + L(dpd)Pr(Hd) 
       = 0·0.3+1·0.7 = 0.7.  
This expected loss also characterizes decision d3 (P has PA, and D has no PA) 
because RP theory stipulates that d3 forms the basis for a conviction (dp). 
However, this expected loss, 0.7, is considerably higher than the expected loss of 
the rival RP decisions d1 and d2. Thus, the decision d3 is non-optimal in decision-
theoretic terms. We express this by double-barring the d3 decision branch. Since, 
in RP theory, an acquittal is not an option stipulated under decision d3 (P has PA, 
and D has no PA), the decision tree does not include it. However, we added it 
tentatively, using dashed lines, but merely to illustrate its expected loss. This 
allows us to show why the rival decisions d1 and d2 are better in this case: they are 
better because they stipulate an acquittal (decision dd) which, under the current 
circumstance (i.e., assigned probabilities and losses), has a lower expected loss. 





Formal models of the legal process involving mathematical structures face a 
stream of critiques. Proposals of explicitly non-formalistic approaches, such as 
RP, emphasise greater versatility, but attract their own critiques, such as a lack of 
unequivocal and precisely articulable decision criteria. Some challenges apply to 
both mathematical and non-formalistic perspectives, such as the extent to which 
they can realistically be expected to find consistent application across different 
decision-making bodies.  
While these methodological and conceptual divides seem insurmountable, 
they pose a fundamental challenge to both perspectives. On the one hand, RP 
cannot (afford to) dispense with logically defensible reasoning patterns altogether 
in favour of a vague intuition about what it means to say that a story is plausible. 
RP does not explicitly provide commonly understandable, i.e. linguistic criteria 
for its basic concept (plausibility). On the other hand, the mathematical nature of 
more formal perspectives remains a hurdle in practice given the holistic and 
qualitative tendencies of human reasoning processes. The feasibility of providing 
a logical architecture for RP assessments demonstrates how different perspectives 
can beneficially interact. We have sought to provide such an architecture by 
conceptualising and explaining RP assessments as decisions, using the conceptual 
framework of decision theory as a vehicle for capturing, analysing and conveying 
the logical relationships between the ostensible competing concepts of RP and 
classic decision theory. This structural analysis supports the view that adherence 
to one or the other of the examined perspectives does not imply a contradiction, 
but reflects the coverage of different aspects of the same overall decision process. 
Our architecture also preserves the RP property of not being bound by any sort of 
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external measure against which particular accounts are to be assessed. In our 
analysis, RP assessments represent observable surface features of decision-
making behaviour that explain the grounds of verdicts (conviction and acquittal). 
Notwithstanding, these ultimate issues inevitably remain – in their nature – 
decisions under uncertainty that can be formally characterised in classic decision 
theoretic terms.  
There is no prescriptive suggestion, at this point, for the abstract and 
theoretical decision structures we have described to be quantitatively implemented 
in current legal proceedings. They are merely means to gain insight into the nature 
of the problems that evidence and proof disciplines confront, and for discussants 





APPENDIX: FURTHER PROPERTIES OF THE DECISION-THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF 
RELATIVE PLAUSIBILITY 
 
Consider again the example presented in §IV.II.b. Figure A1 shows the 
expected losses for the RP decisions d1, d2 and d3 not only for the current case 
where the probabilities for the prosecution’s and defence’s accounts are, 
respectively, 0.3 and 0.7, but for the full range of values between 0 and 1. As may 
be seen, RP decisions d1 (P has no PA) and d2 (P has PA, and D has a PA) are 
optimal, i.e. have the minimum expected loss, for a broad range of probabilities, 
including probabilities greater than 0.5 (i.e., when the probability of the 
prosecution’s account is greater than that of the defence).  
There is a transition point, however, toward the right-hand side of Figure A1. 
For probabilities greater than this change point, the expected loss of decision d3 
(P has PA, D has no PA) is smaller than that of the alternative decisions d1 and 
decision d2. This threshold probability corresponds to the minimum probability 
necessary in the classic decision theoretic account to ensure that the decision dp 
(finding for the prosecution; conviction) has a smaller expected loss than the 
decision dd (Acquit), given a particular loss ratio as specified by Equation (2). 
Recall that in the case here, an erroneous finding for the prosecution (Cpd) is 
considered ten times worse than an erroneous acquittal (Cdp). Thus, following 
Equation (2), the odds defining the transition point are 10:1, corresponding to 
Pr(Hp)=0.91.  
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Figure A1: Expected losses (on y-axis) of RP decisions d1 (PA has no PA), d2 (PA has PA, and 
D has PA) and d3 (PA has PA, and D has no PA) as a function of the probability of the 
prosecution’s case (x-axis), Pr(Hp), for the example discussed in the text. The dotted vertical 
line at Pr(Hp)=0.3 indicates the expected losses for decisions d1 and d2 , i.e. 0.03, and decision 
d3, i.e. 0.7. Note that these values correspond to the values illustrated in the decision tree shown 
in Figure 5. The dotted vertical line at Pr(Hp)=0.91 indicates the transition point where, for 
probabilities greater than this value, decision d3 (PA has PA, and D has no PA) has a smaller 
expected loss, and hence is better than the alternative decisions d1 and d2. The bold line 
indicates, for every probability Pr(Hp) between 0 and 1, the decision(s) with the minimum 
expected loss. 
 
It is important to keep this result in mind because when looking at Figure A1, 
the skeptical reader may ask how it can be possible that for a probability of the 
prosecution’s account, Pr(Hp), as high as 0.8, or even 0.9, the decisions d1 (P has 
no PA) and d2 (P has PA, and D has a PA) have a lower expected loss, and hence 
are preferable to decision d3 (P has PA, and D has no PA). As noted above, the 
explanation for this observation stems from the chosen loss function, in particular 
the ratio of the loss associated with an erroneous finding for the prosecution (Cpd) 
and the loss associated with an erroneous acquittal (Cdp). In the case here we have 
chosen, for the sole purpose of illustration, a ratio of 10:1. Hence, a finding for 
the prosecution is not warranted, in decision theoretic terms, for situations in 
which the probability for the prosecution’s case, Pr(Hp), is smaller than 0.91. Case 
examples with loss ratios so that values of Pr(Hp) as high as 0.8 or 0.9 would be 
sufficient for the RP decision d3 (P has PA, and D has no PA) to be optimal in a 
decision-theoretic sense can be found in Table 1. More generally, note that we do 
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not suggest, at this point, that a full numerical quantification be imposed on 
practical RP decisions. The sole point we seek to make is that it is possible to give 
a formal (mathematical) justification for the intuition that the higher the stakes 
involved (i.e., the more one of the two ways of deciding erroneously is considered 
worse than the other), the lower should be one’s quantum of doubt. 
As a last example, consider a case in which the prosecution’s account Hp is 
considerably more probable that the account presented by the defence, Hd. 
Specifically, let Pr(Hp) be 0.95. Table A1 summarises a few examples of cases 
with different loss ratios (columns 1 to 3). The optimal RP decision and related 
verdict for each example is given in columns 6 and 7. Note, in particular, that for 
loss ratios such as 100:1, or more, a current belief of 0.95 is not sufficient to 
warrant the RP decision d3 (P has a PA, and D has no PA).  
 












1 1 1 0.5 0.95 d3 dp 
1 0.5 2 0.66 0.95 d3 dp 
1 0.1 10 0.91 0.95 d3 dp 
1 0.01 100 0.99 0.95 d1 or d2 dd 
1 0.001 1000 0.999 0.95 d1 or d2 dd 
 
Table A1: Extension of Table 1 with optimal RP decision(s) (in column 6) and associated 
verdict (in column 7) for a hypothetical case in which the decision-maker’s probability for the 
prosecution’s account, Hp, is 0.95. The possible RP decisions are: d1 (PA has no PA), d2 (PA 
has PA, and D has PA) and d3 (PA has PA, and D has no PA). Decisions dp and dd represent the 
verdicts ‘convict’ and ‘acquit’, respectively. Column 4 provides the minimum probability 
necessary, in the classic decision-theoretic account, to ensure that the expected loss for deciding 
for the prosecution, dp, is smaller than the expected loss for deciding in favour of the defence, 
dd, given different loss ratios (column 3). Note that a loss ratio x > 1 means that the loss incurred 
by an erroneous decision dp (column 1) is x times greater than the loss incurred by an erroneous 
decision dd (column 2). We assume that an erroneous finding for the prosecution, i.e. a wrongful 
conviction, Cpd, is the overall worst consequence and thus assigned the loss 1.     
 
As an aside, note that throughout this paper, all examples considered a loss 
ratio x ≥ 1, which means that the loss incurred by an erroneous decision dp (i.e., 
wrongful conviction) is at least equal or greater than the loss incurred by an 
erroneous decision dd (i.e., erroneous acquittal). Consideration of opposite cases 
seems unnecessary given current understandings of the values upheld in 
contemporary legal orders. 
We also emphasise the important conclusion that there is no single and 
absolute probability to warrant a particular RP decision d3 (P has a PA, and D has 
no PA) and hence a finding for the prosecution (decision dp, conviction). In our 
decision-theoretic account of RP, the minimum probability necessary to warrant 
a conclusion that the prosecution has a plausible account (and that the defence 
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does not have a plausible account) is found by weighing the odds of the two 
competing accounts against the losses that may be incurred by the two ways in 
which a verdict may turn out erroneously. This offers an answer to the recurrent 
critique of the RP theory that it does not provide an explicit criterion for decision-
makers to determine when exactly the prosecution’s account has reached the 
required level of proof and, in addition, the defences’ account is insufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
